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
8 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Vance on the NRO, 6 March 1965

1. In accordance with the arrangements made between Mr. McCone and the Secretary of Defense, General Carter and Mr. Bross called on Mr. Vance in his office 6 March at 1000 hours. The purpose was to explain to Mr. Vance how the NRO actually operates and proposals designed to eliminate current frictions and establish a basis for harmonious working relationships between CIA and the Defense Department.

2. General Carter reviewed and explained the various charts which we had with us, and which had been prepared for the occasion. The first was the chart prepared by Dr. McMillan. This was dismissed as a vast oversimplification which was adequate only to show the area of the coordinating responsibility of the D/NRO. The chart was inadequate to show the functional responsibilities of individual components of CIA or Defense and their interrelation.

3. General Carter explained in some detail the chart with three overlays designed to show the present workings of the NRO. The basic chart showed the various components of CIA and the Defense Department engaged in basic activities of the NRO (OSA, Office of ELINT, ). The first overlay imposed the lines of authority exercised by the D/NRO (Under Secretary of the Air Force) over program elements of the NRO, including Program B, embracing CIA activities under Col. Ledford. This chart clearly shows the D/NRO's line of authority over a subordinate element of CIA. General Carter next explained the second overlay, which portrayed the working relationships which currently exist in the satellite reconnaissance field.

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He stressed the development of requirements in USIB; the launch responsibility located between SSD and NRO, and General Greer's identification with SSD and NRO; the process by which payloads (CORONA, [REDACTED]) are made available to the launching authorities; the role of contractors in the assembly of the launch vehicle; the process by which the ephemeris of the mission is determined; the fact that [REDACTED] continues to be carried in an R&D phase by NRO and thereby is subject to different pre and inflight control and direction; the ELINT mission of certain payloads, etc. General Carter next explained the final overlay, which described the manned aircraft activities of the NRO with particular reference to procedures for policy clearance by the 303 Committee, flight planning submitted to the NRO, and the support function of the Air Force. There was reference to [REDACTED]. The point was made that go/no-go decisions on manned aircraft overflights were made by the Central Intelligence Agency (within over-all policy authorization by the 303 Committee) in view of the DCI's responsibility for relations with foreign governments on clandestine matters, etc. This was used as an illustration of why CIA had to appear as an active participant in at least certain of the NRO operational activities. Mr. Vance indicated his understanding of this point.

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4. The chart representing the proposed organizational arrangements was then explained with a statement that this was a purely conceptual chart which did not include in detail the functional components of either CIA or the Defense establishment which would carry out specific program responsibilities. Emphasis was put on:

a. The formal recognition which the chart gives to the Executive Committee, consisting of the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

b. The role of the D/NRO, whose formal relationship with CIA is established with the head of the Agency for the purpose of communicating requests for action and decisions of the Executive Committee and other formal communications. The importance of a working relationship between the D/NRO and his staff and DD/S&T of CIA was stressed and in this connection general agreement was expressed by everyone

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present with the importance of the exchange of information and of arrangements to keep the D/NRO thoroughly informed of the status of operational and research activities conducted by the Agency.

c. The role of the SOC in determining the intelligence mission of satellite operations; the fact that the SOC should be located under the CIA where it would be responsive to USIB; and the fact that an intelligence representative would be located in the center responsible for launch and inflight phases of the operation as an observer and consultant to the officer in charge of this center.

d. The role of CIA in research and development of new systems and the fact that the responsibility of CIA in this respect should continue into the production phase of payloads, both for the purpose of ensuring engineering improvements in on-going systems and for the purpose of ensuring the CIA R&D component continuity of experience in the state of the art.

e. The assignment to a component under the direction of the Secretary of Defense responsibility for launch, inflight control and recovery of payloads.

5. There followed some general discussion of the proposed arrangements and of existing problems in the administration of the NRP.

a. Mr. Vance agreed that the ephemeris for all satellite missions for intelligence purposes [REDACTED] (CORONA) should be handled in the same way (e.g., under the proposed SOC).

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b. The Executive Committee should be institutionalized, function on the basis of an agenda, and issue minutes recording its deliberations. Mr. Vance thought that the D/NRO should attend all sessions and General Carter pointed out that representatives of components involved in specific deliberations of the Executive Committee should be represented and heard on specific matters with which they are concerned.

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c. The role of the D/NRO requires clarification and represents perhaps the most difficult element of the problem. The objectionable implications of the various attempts to give the D/NRO command authority over subordinate elements of CIA were reviewed and discussed. The point was made that the existing agreement attempts to take care of this problem by designating the Deputy D/NRO from CIA and making him responsible for the transmission of instructions and directives to CIA components. There was some discussion of the history of the early organization of the NRO, going back to Mr. Bissell's time and the relationship between Dr. Charyk and Dr. Scoville.

6. Mr. Vance was particularly concerned with the necessity for procedures which would permit the Executive Committee to control the allocation of new ventures in systems development. He thought that thresholds should be established which would determine responsibility for advising the Executive Committee about new research projects. He said that his first assignment in the Pentagon had been to develop procedures which would rationalize competition between services in the missile and space fields. He thought that a limitation of \$10,000 had been put on the expenditure of funds for the development of new systems by any of the services without the approval of the Secretary of Defense. It was generally agreed that procedures could be developed which could accommodate Mr. Vance's concern and give him complete assurance on this point.

7. There was some discussion of the process involved in the procurement and assembly of components for space vehicles and boosters. General Carter explained existing procedures in some detail and the role of contractors, the need for technical direction and contemplated future arrangements in this area. In this connection there was also some discussion of the need for representation by CIA at the assembly phase of payloads for which it had the developmental and engineering responsibility (as part of a team).

8. Mr. Vance then read the memorandum which had been prepared by CIA explaining the proposed organizational arrangement. He concluded the session by asking that:



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a. A new chart defining the new proposed arrangement (complete with Executive Committee, D/NRO, etc.) be prepared as an overlay to the existing chart describing the current working of the satellite aspects of the NRP. He said that he would find such a chart necessary in explaining the proposal to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Vance thought that the satellite program was the important problem and that we could concentrate on that to the exclusion of the manned aircraft program in discussions with the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McNamara, however, would want to have a chart which shows the specific programs and the interrelated program responsibility of specific components.

b. Paragraph 5 of the CIA memorandum be expanded, clarifying in detail the specific roles contemplated by each of the sub paragraphs of this paragraph. For example, he felt that the specific functions of the Executive Committee, the question of thresholds for approval of new R&D projects should be spelled out specifically. He reiterated a point earlier made to the fact that much of the difficulty currently experienced in the NRO was attributable to a lack of understanding or agreement concerning the responsibilities and authority of individuals and components. In order to eliminate this kind of misunderstanding in the future, he felt that there should be rather explicit statements of functions and responsibilities as they are now contemplated.

9. The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the situation in Vietnam and some expressions of Mr. Vance's concern about developments in Indonesia.

/s/ John A. Bross

JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

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